Theodore Millon’s 9 Principles for Conceptualizing Personality and Its Disorders

“1. Personality disorders are not diseases.

2. Personality disorders are internally differentiated functional and structural systems, not internally homogeneous entities.

3. Personality disorders are dynamic systems, not static, lifeless entities.

4. Personality consists of multiple units at multiple data levels.

5. Personality exists on a continuum. No sharp division exists between normality and pathology.

6. Personality pathogenesis is not linear, but sequentially interactive and multiply distributed through the entire system.

7. Personality criteria by which to assess pathology should be logically coordinated with the systems model itself.

8. Personality disorders may be assessed, but not definitively diagnosed.

9. Personality disorders require strategically planned an combinatorial modes of tactical intervention.”

An introduction to critical realism

Critical realism is distinct in important respects from mainstream realism. First, let us get to the basics. Critical realism is essentially an ontological position. It is not epistemological. Indeed, Andrew Sayer says that this form of realism is quite permissive when it comes to epistemology. All it requires is that we believe in a world existing independently of us, that has causal efficacy whether we exist or care about it at all. Thus, this is different from the social constructionism currently popular among social scientists. According to such thinkers, reality is socially constructed and constituted by linguistic norms. Critical realists, like other realists, accept that there is a world which exists independently of us.

Yet just because the world exists independently of us, that does not mean that we have unmediated access to it. To be sure, social and linguistic and political norms profoundly affect the way we think. Thus, we do not (necessarily?) have access to the truth. All we can know is that it does indeed exist, although this does not mean we have unmediated access to it. The problem with writers like Thomas Kuhn is that, although they introduced indeterminacy into the subjective realm, he did not articulate a sense in which reality exists independently from the mental and social and political paradigms we rely upon when we investigate the world.
In any case, accepting Roy Bhaskar’s form of ontological realism does not mean that we end up being positivists or naive epistemological realists. We must take account of the various forces which constituted our subjectivity, and this includes both social and non-social factors. Andrew Sayer recounts his own experience in battling both social constructionism and naive realism, demonstrating how we can be realists in ontology while also acknowledging how utterly messy the world is and how precarious our attempt to acquire knowledge about it empirically. Sayer explored “the aftermath of the major debates in the philosophy of science of the 1960s and 70s – the philosophy of science, and the anti-naturalist approaches of interpretivism or hermeneutics in the philosophy of social science.” It was within this context that critical realists “offered an alternative to empiricism and conventionalism in the philosophy of natural science, and to positivism and interpretivism in the philosophy of natural science,
I started out with critiques of positivism, especially its expectation that the social world could be shown to be a composite of a number of behavioural regularities which would eventually be described by social laws akin to those of natural science…In attempting to develop an understanding of these that was both dynamic and spatial, it slowly dawned on me that social systems were necessarily open, and that they evolved rather than equilibrated, not least because people have the capacity to learn and change their behaviour. Consequently, I realized the goal of finding rough regularities, let alone laws, to describes social systems, was a pipe dream…”
Now let us proceed to an articulation of what critical realism actually teaches. First, it acknowledges a distinction between what it refers to as the transitive vs. the intransitive. The intransitive world refers to the objective world that is distinct and independent from us. It is the world in itself. On the other than, there is the realm of theories and discourses and resources which constitute the transitive dimension of scientific knowledge. The theories of the transitive realm can say virtually anything whereas the world of the intransitive is what it is. Thus, against positivists, reality is theory-laden and discourse always mediates our pursuit of knowledge. However, this does not mean that the world can be reduced to this discourse. It exists independently from us as well.
Next, Bhaskar makes three basic ontological distinctions about the intransitive world: There is the real, the actual and the empirical. The “real” refers to whatever exists in terms of its causal powers or processes:
“First, the real is whatever exists, be it natural or social, regardless of whether it is an empirical object for us, and whether we happen to have an adequate understanding of its nature. Secondly, the realm is the realm of objects, their structures and powers. Whether they be physical, like minerals, or social like bureaucracies, they have certain structures and causal powers, that is, capacities to behave in particular ways, and causal liabilities or passive powers, that is, specific susceptibilities to certain kinds of change. In the transitive dimension of science we try to identify these structures and powers, such as the way in which bureaucracies can process large volumes of routine information very quickly, in virtue of their structure (hierarchical organization, specialization and filing systems, etc.). Similarly, individuals , in virtue of their physical make up, when they are currently unemployed and idle. Realists therefore seek to identify both necessity and possibility or potential in the world – what things must go together, and what could happen, given the nature of objects.”
Thus, the domain of the “real” refers to whatever exists in general, and this includes both the subjective and the objective, the transitive and the intransitive. The “real” refers to things in general as opposed to the “actual,” which refers to the activation of these powers. It refers to “what they do and what eventuates when they do, such as when the bureaucracy’s powers are activated and it engages in activities such as classifying and invoicing, or the previously idle person does some work.” Lastly, there is the empirical. This refers purely to the subjective domain of experience.
Next, we must understand the critical realist approach to understanding stratification and emergence. The aforementioned distinction between the real, the empirical and the actual helps us provide what is known as a “stratified” ontology. This is to be opposed as the “flat” ontologies “populated by either the actual or the empirical, or a conflation of the two. Thus empirical realism assumes that what we can observe is all that exists, while ‘actualism’ assumes that what actually happens at the level of events exhausts the world, leaving no domain of the real, of powers which can be either activated or remain dormant.” It is thus important to consider the “empirical” “real” in terms of ontology. That is, our subjective experiences cannot be relegated to mere epistemology or philosophical anthropology. Instead, subjects, their experiences and ideas are “real” and can be studied in terms of ontology. This means that Heidegger is correct in his description of fundamental ontology as phenomenology insofar as the phenomenological falls under the realm of the ontological (even if we may disagree with him concerning his perception of the phenomenological as “fundamental”).
The critical realist acknowledges that the world is constituted in terms of emergence. Thus, systems are more than the sum total of their parts. This means that there are “situations in which the conjunction of two of more features or aspects gives rise to new phenomena, which have properties which are irreducible to those of their constituents, even though the latter are necessary for their existence.” Thus, “social phenomena are emergent from biological phenomena, which are in turn emergent from the chemical and physical strata. Thus the social practice of conversing is dependent on one’s physiological state, including the signals sent and received around our brain cells, but conversing is not reducible tot hose physiological processes. Reductionist explanations which ignore emergent properties are therefore inadequate.”
Thus, critical realism is not reductionistic. It acknowledges the existence of multiple levels of strata and supervenience without requiring that all that emerges from it be reducible to it. Sayer summarizes helpfully both sides of the equation:
“…while we don’t have to go back to the level of biology or chemistry to explain social phenomena, this does not mean the former have no effect on society. Nor does it mean we can ignore the way in which we rect back on other strata, for example through contraception, medicine, agriculture and pollution.”
This takes place in a complicated manner in the social world, in such a way that complicates the facile distinction between agent and structure:
“In the social world, people’s roles and identities are often internally related, so that what one person or institution is or can do, depends on their relation to others; thus, what it is to be a tutor cannot be explained at the level of individuals but only in terms of their relation to students, and vice versa. The powers which they draw upon depend partly on their relations to one another, and to relevant parts of the context, such as educational institutions…Internal relations fall outside the ontological grids of positivism, which systematically misrepresents society by presenting such phenomena as reducible to independent individuals or atoms. At the same time, we can be affected by things whose existence and position is only contingently or externally related to our own existence, by chance encounters. Individual biographies are crucially influenced by such accidents.”
Part of the articulation of critical realism requires an understanding of its understanding of causation. Bhaskar critiques the HUmean “successionist” view of causation according to which it involves regularities among “sequences of events.” It is the distinction between the real and the actual that will help us deconstruct this Humean account of causation and demonstrate why it is problematic. Causation cannot merely be understood as the regular succession of events. Instead, it involves the search for causal mechanism. Mere observation of successive events does not allow us to acquire knowledge or understand causation. We do not go looking for social “laws” as the positivist might do from the Humean perspective:
“The conventional impulse to prove causation by gathering data on regularities, repeated occurrences, is therefore misguided; at best these might suggest where to look for candidates for causal mechanisms. What causes something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times we have observed it happening. Explanation depends instead on identifying causal mechanisms and how they work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions.”
Thus, we must discover the nature of the structure or an object that we are studying, looking into the mechanisms or powers which produce it:
“the teacher’s power to mark pupils’ work depends on his or her knowledge and qualifications and on being accepted by the school and public as legitimate; the price mechanisms depends on structures of competitive relations between profit-seeking firms producing for markets, and so on. Again, the dependence of social structures on, inter alia, shared understandings is evident in these examples, in terms of the acceptance of the teacher’s right to teach, and the public’s understanding of the meaning of money in the case of price competition.”
Of course, within the realm of the real is the hermeneutic or subjective realm. The subjective realm is a realm of meaning that must be interpreted rather than merely measured or counted quantitatively. Nevertheless, the subjective and the material always interact with one another:
“Meanings are related to material circumstances and practical contexts in which communication takes place and to which reference is made. so while we can endorse much of hermeneutics, realism insists a) on the material commitments and settings of communicative interaction, and b) on the presence of a non-discursive, material dimension to social life.”
Indeed:
“Where researchers are concerned with discourses and the meaningful qualities of social practices, understanding these is not a matter of a bstraction followed by concrete synthesis, but of interpretation. However, realists would add that to interpret what actors mean we have to relate their discourse to its referents and contexts. It also needs to be remembered that social reality is only partly text-like. Much of what happens does not depend on or correspond to actors’ understandings; there are unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions and things can happen to people regardless of their understandings.”
While the ontology of critical realism is compatible with multiple different research methods, we must understand the distinction between intensive and extensive research methods. Both are important and complement one another, but there is a distinction which the critical realist believes many others may miss out on. The intensive approach begins with individuals. Not an individual person, necessarily, just a selection from the world. WE take a selection of the world as an individual and we “trace the main causal (including discursive) relationships into which they enter and study their qualitative nature as well as their number.” Extensive research, however, involves description of patterns or regularities. Important though the extensive approach is to social sciences, it is important not to do what positivists do and base all our research on description of regularities or the quantitative or clearly measurable.
The intensive research director might ask how a process works in a specific case or small number of cases. They would also be interested in which causal mechanisms in these particular cases introduce certain changes and what specific agents in a specific location actually end up doing. The extensive researcher, in the same instance, may want to describe distinguishing features of a population or whatever regularities or common patterns obtain within that population and how widely specific characteristics or processes may be represented and distributed elsewhere. This would be the difference between the sorts of questions different researchers may ask. Thus, there is a close parallel between the intensive and the idiographic, on the one hand, and the extensive and the nomothetic, on the one hand. Where the intensive is interested in causal groups, the extensive is associated with taxonomic groups, classifying and universalizing.
On the one hand, the intensive researcher is concerned with causal grouping, when it comes to the sorts of groups studied, whereas the extensive is concerned with taxonomic groups because he is interested in describing and categorizing and cataloging regularities. While the intensive researcher wants to look at causal explanations of the production of certain events or objects, the type of account produced which the extensive researcher wants to look at consists of “Descriptive ‘representative’ generalizations, lacking in explanatory penetration.” The intensive researcher wants to look at substantial relations of connection in concrete instances, whereas the extensive researcher wants to look at “formal relations of similarity.” Those engaged in extensive research may use statistical analyses and large-scale surveys of relevant representative samples or populations, whereas the intensive researcher might want to look at specific, individual instances, agents or events in their causal contexts. Both of these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, and both are necessary. Both are complementary to one another.  The intensive researcher might want to focus on looking at open systems, whereas the extensive researcher is involved in the creation of artificially “closed” systems in which certain generalizations can be made from the observation of regularities.

What is maladaptive daydreaming?

Maladaptive daydreaming” is a clinical construct coined by the clinical psychologist Eli Somer. He defines it as “extensive fantasy activity that replaces human interaction and/or interferes with academic, interpersonal, or vocational functioning.” In his article on the subject, four of six patients in a trauma practice were diagnosed with a dissociative disorder and two were diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder. He summarizes the main heads under which he analyzes the concept: “Identified MD functions included Disengagement from Stress and Pain by Mood Enhancement and, Wish Fulfillment, Fantasies;and Companionship,Intimacy,and Soothing. Recurrent themes were Violence;Idealized Self; Power and Control; Captivity; Rescue and Escape; and Sexual Arousal.”

Somer notes that the vast majority of individuals daydream. He also notes psychologists who point to individuals who exhibit “fantasy-prone personalities,” and who spend the majority of their lives in their own fantasy world. Many of those with fantasy-prone personalities engage in daydreaming or “fantasizing as a means of coping with loneliness or isolation and escaping from aversive environments.” He notes another psychologist who argues that it is correlated with “an aversive childhood environment, including harsh physical and sexual abuse.”

But what functions do these daydreams serve?

1) “Disengagement from Stress and Pain by Mood Enhancement and Wish Fulfillment fantasies – All of those whom Somer studied admitted that an important element of their daydreaming had to do with escaping painful reality and constructing an alternate reality that is more palatable. It makes them feel powerful rather than impotent, safe rather than afraid. One of the narcissistic patients reported using sexual daydreaming to feel dominant and in control.

2) “Companionship, Intimacy, and Soothing” – The purpose of these was to make up for disappointing or absent romantic realities. One subject admitted to fantasizing about cuddling with his girlfriend while watching a movie, and another admitted to fantasizing that he was still with a girl who had devastated him by rejecting him.

There are recurrent themes in these daydreaming episodes as well. One of the most disturbing is violence

1) Violence – Five of the six individuals spoke of violent fantasies which did not seem to produce any internal conflict with them. In other words, they genuinely identified with the person in their daydreams. They would oftentimes fantasize about hurting or killing others, oftentimes in an extremely gruesome or sadistic manner.

2) Idealized Self – In this theme, the individuals fantasize about whom they wish they could be. One man who felt sexually inadequate would frequently fantasize about being loved by many women.

3) Power and Control – This motif has to do with domination and control. One of the subjects reports fantasizing about dialogues in such a way that they are latered to cause the subject to be the victor. The participant repeatewdly relives such scenarios in which he says the perfect thing. One of the fantasies of another participant had to do with the domination of women.

4) Captivity, Rescue and Escape – The participants who reported these “often felt ensnared in their abusive environments, trapped in avoidance of their tormented pasts, and evasion of life’s challenges”(Somer). They construct elaborate fantasies of successfully escaping violent scenarios.

5) Sexual arousal – One of the subjects admitted to engaging in rape fantasies. She used it to fall asleep. Another subject likewise admitted that he only fell asleep after fantasizing about seducing a woman. Yet another admitted that he preferred fantasizing about sexual domination to actual intercourse with his girlfriend.

Dynamics:

1) Onset – In all of the participants, the daydreaming began with difficult experiences in childhood. One began after her grandfather had molested her at the age of 8. Another admits her fantasizing began during a period of incest with her brother. Yet another recalled that she had begun after being incestuously victimized, and that this was likely the reuslt of ac ombination of this traumatic experience with a fantasy-prone or imaginative personality. In yet another participant, the fantasizing predated humiliation over delayed puberty, but became increasingly compensatory and grandiose at this time. He would imagine himself as a successful soccer player. In yet another instance, one of the participants began to fantasize about a continued romantic relationship following its traumatic dissolution. At the age of 16, during which this took place, his fantasy life became so elaborate that he dropped out of school.

2) Kinesthetic elements – The daydreamers report engaging in different activities while daydreaming. One of the participants reported pacing back and forth for hours.

Somer suggests that the “kinesthetic element served as hypnotic induction and deepening device, and points out the similarities between day dreaming and hypnosis. This finding is in line with past research reports on the relation-ship between childhood trauma, imagination and hypnotizability.”

Summarizing the study, he says:

“This study sheds preliminary light on the subjective experience and meaning of malignant fantasy in a group of psychotherapy patients. Analysis of the participants’ verbatim transcripts leads to the conclusion that these bright persons may have had a creative but normal imaginary disposition that preceded their child-hood predicaments. Painful interpersonal experiences encountered during a time when basic assumptions about the world and their self-images were developing,sent these young persons into their much safer imaginary world.”

He concludes:

“Analyses of the interviews provided for this study reveal a more complex picture that does not render strong support to this theoretical formulation. Whereas,all respondents reported varying degrees of negative daydreaming experiences,they also described a rich variety of rewarding daydreams relating to images of an idealized self involved in empowered behaviors, adjusted interpersonal conduct,and soothing experiences. The data from this study suggest that MD could, at least partially, be explained as a phobic behavior reflecting the avoidant alternative.Negative MD often included representations of aversive experiences, maladjusted responses and their meanings.This imaginary process serves as a painful reminder of the threats associated with the real world, increases phobic fears, and promotes avoidant behavior. The avoidance is rewarded not only by the negative reinforcement associated with the removal of the aversive stimulus, but also by the positive day dreaming, which provides an alternative of vividly satisfying emotional experiences.”

Understanding the linguistic turn

Jonathan Edwards on the Self

MBTI

abductive reasoning and MBTI

Abduction is often referred to as “inference to the best explanation.” It is “a type of inference that assigns special status to explanatory considerations”(Douven 2011). It is a form of reasoning we use both in everyday life and in scientific reasoning (indeed, many would argue that its use in scientific reasoning is a simply a refined extension of our everyday reasoning)(Douven 2011). Douven’s example is that of two people having an awful argument with one another that apparently ended their friendship, yet one then sees then jogging together the next day(Douven 2011). The most likely explanation, or the inference to the best explanation, is that they made up with one another and resolved whatever issue(s) they may have had(Douven 2011). This is an example of abductive reasoning. Based on what we know or think we know about the world, we come up with a hypothesis which we are convinced most likely explains the phenomena. He gives another example where there is the slim yet interesting possibility that abduction might fail. Douven describes a scenario in which one enters into a kitchen in the morning to find a plate with bread crumbs. The most likely explanation of data, based on what one knows about the world, is that one’s roommate got up in the middle of the night for a midnight snack. He points out that it is also possible that someone broke into your house and made him or herself something to eat while on the job(Douven 2011). However, one generally does not seriously consider such an explanation likely. Douven, Igor, “Abduction”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/>. Continuing from the previous article, another example of abductive reasoning is assuming the human origin of Mount Rushmore. It is perhaps theoretical possible that purely natural processes gave rise to the shapes we see in Mount Rushmore, but we immediately reject such an explanation as improbable in the extreme and reason that the best explanation is that a human deliberately and meticulously carved out the faces of presidents in the mountain. What is interesting about examples like this is that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises.(Douven 2011). I have absolutely no statistical or scientific data whatsoever (or anything that could be peer reviewed) by which I could prove that Mount Rushmore was created by humans. Yet we are certain of the truth of such an hypothesis (and what is interesting is that it is nothing but an hypothesis). These are examples of abduction, also known today as “inference to the best explanation.” In the coming articles, we will explore the difference between abduction, and other forms of reasoning, such as deduction(whose valid arguments are such that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false and induction(probabilistic reasoning based on empirical observation).

There are three forms of inference: induction, deduction, and abduction. As we have seen before, deduction is a form of reasoning in which it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. A straightforward example of this would be the syllogism: All Ps are Qs. A is a P. Therefore, A is a Q. The conclusion irresistibly follows from the premises.

If we say, however, that Bob is tall, Bob lives in Florida, and most people living in Florida are tall, such reasoning may be possibly true, perhaps even probably true, but the conclusion does not necessarily follow from premises. Such reasoning is non-necessary and probabilistic. It is possible for the premises to be true yet the conclusion false. The same is true of the Mt. Rushmore example we saw before. The notion that the faces of the presidents in Mt. Rushmore did not arise from purely natural causes but were instead deliberately and carefully carved by humans over a long period of time does not necessarily follow from any premises. It may not only be probable, but so probable as to be negligibly different from certainty, but the conclusions still do not necessarily follow from the premises.

Douven describes inductive inferences not simply as probabilistic, but more specifically, those inferences which are based on statistical data(Douven 2011). The observer notes frequencies occurrencies of something in a given demographic and reasons about them(Douven 2011). For example, 99% of Floridians are tall; Bob is a Floridian; therefore, Bob is almost certainly tall. Once again, this is an inductive or probabilistic inference, so it is not infallible, but based instead on probabilities.

Douven notes that statistical data can be stated in a vaguer, more ‘qualitative’ manner(Douven 2011). For example, one can state explain data in a more purely quantitative manner (99% of Floridians are tall) or in a more qualitative manner(most Floridians are tall). Douven notes, however, that merely basing an inference upon statistical data does not necessarily make that inference inductive(Douven 2011). He argues that, if one observes many gray elephants and no non-gray elephants, the inference that there are only gray elephants would be abductive rather than inductive(Douven 2011).

The reason for this is that although in both inductive and abductive reasoning the conclusion does not necessarily follow according to the premises, un abduction, there is either an implicit or explicit appeal to explanatory considerations, whereas induction, there is merely an appeal to observed frequencies and statistics(Douven 2011). The reason the gray elephant example is an instance of abduction rather than induction is not simply because no appeal is made to frequency, but because the reasoning is the result of the best explanation given the explainer’s information.

C

ontinuing from our previous article, many answer such Cartesian skepticism by arguing that such hypotheses neglect “explanatory considerations…by defining the notion strictly in terms of hypotheses’ making the same predictions”(Douven 2011). For example, although two hypotheses may make similar predictions and may thus seem at least in this respect empirically equivalent, it is possible that one of the theories might violate Ockham’s Razor; i.e., one of the explanatory hypotheses might be a simpler and more commonsense explanation, whereas the other might seem outlandish, contrived, counterintuitive, and so on.

Next, we will discuss various attempts at explaining abductive reasoning. The brilliant American philosopher C.S. Peirce is one of the most important explicators of the concept. We will spend the next few articles discussing his extremely rich and incredibly important contributions to this subject.

The term “abduction”, or abductive reasoning, was coined by the philosopher C.S. Peirce. Abduction, for Peirce, was a distinct form of non-deductive reasoning that was different from what one normally thinks of as induction(Douven 2011). Douven, however, argues that what Peirce meant by abduction is not what we typically take it to mean today(Douven 2011). On the one hand, abduction as understood in contemporary philosophy typically refers to what empirical philosophers of science refer as the “context of justification”(Douven 2011). In other words, abduction is used at “the stage of scientific iniquiry in which we are concerned with the assessment of theories…”(Douven 2011).

What makes Peirce’s understanding of abduction different from the contemporary understanding was that, rather than abduction having its place in the context of justification, it had its place in the context of discovery; in other words, abduction was used as a tool to generate explanatory hypotheses in order to make discoveries, as opposed to using abduction in an attempt to retroactively concoct explanations as to what produced the discoveries we come upon. Abduction for Peirce has more to do with concocting hypotheses in order to discover something rather than thinking of an explanation for something we have already discovered.

It is difficult to find a precise description of abduction in philosophical literature(Douven 2011). The “core idea” in most literature on abductive reasoning involves explanatory considerations having “confirmation-theoretic import, or that explanatory success is a (not unfailing) mark of truth”(Douven 2011). Douven says that such descriptions, however, more or less amount to slogans(Douven 2011). What exactly this description means can be unpacked a great number of different ways. Most basically, however, abductive reasoning must have “inference rules, requiring premises encompassing explanatory considerations and yielding a conclusion that makes some statement about the truth of a hypothesis”(Douven 2011). The question becomes: what premises are required, or what are we allowed to infer from them(Douven 2011)?

The description of abductive reasoning typically found in epistemology textbooks, according to Douven, is something like “Given evidence E and candidates explanations H1,…, Hn of E, infer the truth of that Hi which best explains E”(Douven 2011). Put simply, abductive reasoning, as we have said before, is the use of inference to the best explanation.

The problem of this definition is that it fails to give an interpretation of “candidate explanation” or “best explanation”(Douven 2011). Each of these terms can be interpreted or explained differently, thus giving us completely different, if related, definitions of abduction(Douven 2011). “While some still hope that the former can be spelled out in purely logical, or at least purely formal, terms, it is often said that the latter must appeal to the so-called theoretical virtues, like simplicity, generality, and coherence with well-established theories; the best explanation would then be the hypothesis which, on balance, does best with respect to these virtues”(Douven 2011). The problem is that even these terms are difficult to define, and Douven notes that there are some who argue that these theoretical ‘virtues’ lack any sort of content and therefore constitute nothing but vacuous rhetoric(Douven 2011).

Regardless of how we elaborate abductive reasoning, it will not be sound in a strictly logical sense(Douven 2011). Abductive reasoning can still be considered legitimate insofar as the use of it leads to a correct conclusion, explanatory success, and so on, an estimate of what is approximately, probably, or likely to be true, and so on(Douven 2011). The relativity of the chosen hypothesis is important to take into consideration; “best” is a relative term and the abductively probable explanation is one which, compared to others with which it is compared, best explains the data. Many point out that the explanation must not simply be the “least worst” of available hypotheses, however, but that in an absolute sense it must constitute a satisfactory explanation of the data.

PART 5

Abductive reasoning is also an important factor in many contemporary philosophical debates. It becomes especially important in the role of “underdetermination”(Douven 2011). Discussions of underdetermination occur when two hypotheses of apparently equal epistemic weight, and it becomes difficult to tell whether to favor one over the other(Douven 2011). How can we determine which hypothesis to adopt as the most likely explanation? A famous example of this to which Douven refers is the “Cartesian argument for global skepticism, according to which the hypothesis that reality is…the way we customarily deem it to be is empirically equivalent to a variety of…skeptical hypotheses”(Douven 2011). In other words, the idea that all of what we experience as ‘reality’ may indeed be reality, on the one hand, but on the other it is just as likely be the product of an evil demon producing illusions in us. So how can we ever be truly warranted in choosing this or that hypothesis or set of hypotheses

More stuff yet X

More stuff yet V

More stuff on genes III